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INTRODUCTION
Justice Antonin Scalia and the
Long Game
William K. Kelley*
When President Reagan nominated D.C. Circuit Judge Antonin
Scalia to the Supreme Court in 1986, commentators noted that his gre-
garious and charming personality was an important strength of the
nomination, because the new Justice could be expected to charm his
way to influence on the Court.  The theory was that he would be able
to persuade judges to his point of view by force of personality, much
like the liberal lion Justice William Brennan had reportedly been able
to do for a generation.  One legal analyst predicted, “[Y]ou will not
see him running off and writing separate opinions merely because he
takes exception with small issues or details,” because “[h]e believes it
is important to the country for the Court to get together and to speak
with a single voice.”1  The young and energetic judge dazzled people
across the spectrum.  Even the very liberal Senator Howard Metzen-
baum, a Democrat from Ohio, was charmed, noting facetiously during
* Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School.  This Article is based on remarks deliv-
ered as part of The George Washington Law Review’s Symposium Commemorating the 100th
Anniversary of Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention, held on November 3–4, 2011.
Thanks to The George Washington Law Review for hosting the Symposium, and to Professors
John Manning and Brad Clark for comments on an earlier draft.  Thanks also to Jim Kennedy, a
student at Notre Dame Law School, and to Patti Ogden, Research Librarian at Notre Dame Law
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1 E.R. Shipp, Scalia’s Midwest Colleagues Cite His Love of Debate, Poker and Piano, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 1986, at A7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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his confirmation hearings that Judge Scalia had shown bad judgment
in “whipping” him on the tennis court.2  Judge Scalia immediately in-
terjected, “It was a case of my integrity overcoming my judgment,
Senator.”3  To which Senator Metzenbaum responded, “Touche´.”4
During the summer of 1986, the commentators expected that his keen
intellect combined with his personal charm would make him a force to
be reckoned with on the Court.
Upon taking his seat, Justice Scalia shook up the Court.  His vivid
prose, particularly in separate opinions,5 and his refusal to join opin-
ions containing analysis he found disagreeable6 created something of a
culture shock.7  It is fair to say, moreover, that Justice Scalia’s judicial
style and sometimes caustic pen alienated some of his colleagues, par-
ticularly Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.  An early example was a sharp
dissent filed by Justice Scalia during his second Term, in a case involv-
ing the constitutionality of executing a defendant who was fifteen
years old when he committed his offense.8  Justice O’Connor provided
the fifth vote to reject the death penalty in that case on the ground
that the State had not specifically included fifteen-year-olds as within
the coverage of its capital punishment regime.9  Justice Scalia’s dissent
characterized her position in that case as a “Solomonic” compromise
which “hoist[ed] on to the deck of [the Court’s] Eighth Amendment
2 Hearings on the Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, to be Associate Justice of the Su-
preme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 13 (1986).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657–58 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 610 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6 See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
7 See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Combative Justice Scalia Moves into Ascendancy, BOS. GLOBE,
Apr. 29, 1990, at 1.  It is difficult, of course, to assess a particular Justice’s effect on the Court’s
work. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982)
(analyzing the multitude of factors contributing to opinions issued by the Court beyond the
individual Justices involved).  The public record of votes in cases and the views expressed in
separate opinions provide the only information about where a Justice falls within the Court’s
lineups in particular cases absent inside information. See generally, EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED
CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT (1998); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME
COURT (2007); BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT (1979) (providing examples of the kind of insider information that may bear on the
Court’s lineups in particular cases).  Of course, insider accounts themselves might be unreliable
chronicles of what actually happened within the Court.
8 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 818–19 (1988).
9 Id. at 848–50 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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jurisprudence the loose cannon of a brand new principle.”10  The next
year, Justice Scalia famously characterized Justice O’Connor’s sepa-
rate opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services11 as “irra-
tional”12 and not to be taken “seriously”13—and in the process was
said to have fairly seriously alienated Justice O’Connor.14  Other Jus-
tices were also put off by Justice Scalia’s style.15
Fairly quickly after his appointment, then, the narrative about
Justice Scalia changed.  It turned out that he was not the charmer who
would lead the Court through force of personality, but was instead the
intemperate provocateur whose rhetorical excesses had “cost him the
votes of more moderate conservative justices.”16  After his first decade
of service, Court watchers were increasingly deeming his tenure to be
a disappointment, if not a failure.  Justice Scalia’s performance, ac-
cording to one commentator, had “put an end” to conservatives’
hopes “that he would do for [them] on the Court what Justice Bren-
nan had done so brilliantly for the liberals—build majorities for his
firm ideological positions.”17
Both the initial predictions—that Justice Scalia would influence
the Court’s outcomes through the force of charming personality—and
the midterm assessments—that Justice Scalia’s personality had
counterproductively moved the Court against his preferred out-
comes—fundamentally misunderstood both the internal operations of
the Court and, much more significantly, Justice Scalia as a Justice.
One cannot doubt that Justice Scalia’s sometimes sharp pen might oc-
casionally put off some of his colleagues, just as their opinions might
occasionally do the same to him.  The business of the Court, however,
is not normally done according to personal relationships.  Each Justice
decides on his or her votes based on the merits, and there is no room
for deal making or vote trading.  Of course, this is no insight, but
10 Id. at 877–78 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11 Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
12 Id. at 536 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
13 Id. at 532.
14 See JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE SU-
PREME COURT BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE 277–96 (2005).
15 See JOHN C. JEFFERIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 534–35 (1994); see also
Aaron Epstein, The Interpreter and the Establishment Clause, in A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF THE
SUPREME COURT 126, 136 (Rodney A. Smolla ed., 1995) (noting Justice Anthony Kennedy’s
distaste for Justice Scalia’s rhetoric).
16 David M. O’Brien, This Time, It’s Personal: Justice Scalia’s Increasing Incivility, L.A.
TIMES, July 14, 1996, at M2; see also JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUG-
GLE INSIDE THE REHNQUIST COURT 141 (1995).
17 SIMON, supra note 16, at 138.
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merely a description of how the Court operates.18  One would think
that all of the Justices would be offended by the suggestion that their
votes turn on the state of their personal relationships with others.
As for the misunderstanding of Justice Scalia as a Justice, the
witty line he delivered to Senator Metzenbaum was perhaps more re-
vealing than people understood at the time.19  What he has cared
about all along was more than just getting votes, though he surely
doesn’t object to that.  More important than that, however, is his drive
to get things right—to pursue, with intellectual integrity, a consistent
jurisprudence.  From the beginning of his time on the Court, Justice
Scalia has been playing the long game.  Slowly but surely, he has fun-
damentally transformed the terms of legal debate in this country—in
the courts, in the academy, and in the political process.  Of course, he
has not done this alone.  He has been the most important voice,
though, by virtue of his position on the Court and—yes—the force of
his personality.  Not his charm, but the intellect he has brought to his
jurisprudence and the remarkably effective prose he has produced in
service to that jurisprudence.
His jurisprudential views have transformed the Court in two pri-
mary fields: in his insistence that textualism is the only legitimate
method of statutory interpretation and in his reliance on originalism
in interpreting the Constitution.20  First, the world of statutory inter-
pretation today is utterly different from what it was a generation
ago.21  From the beginning of his tenure, Justice Scalia insisted that a
strong version of textualism was the only legitimate methodology for
statutory interpretation, and rejected as illegitimate reliance on most
forms of legislative history as guides to statutory meaning.  He did this
in case after case, often concurring alone to note his objection to mere
citations of committee reports in Court opinions.22  For Justice Scalia,
the language voted on by both Houses, and signed into law by the
18 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Court Decisions and the Supreme Court, 31 PA. B. ASS’N
Q. 393, 406 (1960) (“Each Justice studies each case in sufficient detail to resolve the question for
himself.”).
19 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
20 Justice Scalia has propounded his positions in case after case, for two and a half de-
cades. See infra note 22.
21 See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 242–45 (1992) (explaining views of statutory in-
terpretation as they have evolved since Justice Scalia joined the Court).
22 For early examples, see Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 616–17 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 529–30 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
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President, is all that is law.  Reliance on committee reports and the
like as guides to statutory meaning, he insisted, was contrary to basic
norms of democratic legitimacy, and worked a transfer of power both
to individual legislators and their staffs and also, not coincidentally, to
the judiciary.23  Justice Scalia did not, of course, make this textualist
move alone.  He built on his own work as a judge on the D.C. Circuit,
and on earlier scholarly work by, among others, academics-turned-
judges Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook.24  Justice Scalia’s tex-
tualism was a frontal challenge to the prevailing norms of the time,
which had adopted a strong purposivism based upon faithful agency
norms that gave priority to what Congress would have wanted, even at
the expense of disregarding the text of the law in question.  When
Justice Scalia became a judge in 1982, the Court’s decision in United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber25—which held that the spirit of Title
VII overcame its concededly clear text in a way that permitted some
voluntary affirmative action by private employers—was but three
years old.26  And it had been scarcely a decade since the Court casu-
ally said in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,27 “Because
of . . . ambiguity [in the legislative history] it is clear that we must look
primarily to the statutes themselves to find the legislative intent.”28
Coincidental with Justice Scalia’s embarking upon a consistent
course of insisting on textualism in every case, the academic field of
statutory interpretation exploded.29  Numerous scholars produced
reams of work challenging Justice Scalia’s methodology.30  Others
took textualism and defended and refined it.31  Although the Court
23 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 29–37 (1997); see also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations
of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516–18 (discussing the role of textualism in judicial review of
agency action).
24 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Rich-
ard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 800 (1983).  I hasten to note that Judge Posner is not himself a textualist, while Judge
Easterbrook decidedly is.
25 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
26 Id. at 193.
27 Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
28 Id. at 412 n.29.
29 See generally Frickey, supra note 21 (describing the growth of statutory interpretation
theory in the last third of the twentieth century); see also JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C.
STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 1–204 (2010).
30 See LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMANN ET AL., THE REGULATORY STATE 345–63 (2010) (citing
and discussing examples).
31 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation,
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68–70 (1994); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the
Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2001); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation
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has continued to rely on legislative history, the dominant interpretive
norm on the Court—even among those Justices, like Justice Breyer,
who defend the use of legislative history where they deem it appropri-
ate32—has come to focus keenly on the text of the statutes at issue.  A
recent prominent example of this phenomenon is the Court’s decision
in Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of Education,33
which required the Court to interpret a complex statute governing the
determination whether states had equalized school expenditures
throughout the districts in the state, permitting them to use federal
grant funds for education in a different way.34  In calculating whether
a state had equalized expenditures, the statute instructed the Secre-
tary of Education to “disregard” school districts “with per-pupil ex-
penditures . . . above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile of
such expenditures . . . in the State.”35  Justice Breyer’s opinion for the
Court concluded that the Secretary could permissibly determine the
relevant percentiles by reference to the total number of students in
the relevant school districts, rather than by the number of school dis-
tricts involved.36  The State had challenged this practice, relying on
what the Court termed the “literal language of the statute.”37
The Court agreed that its precedents require clear and unambigu-
ous language to be given effect, regardless of any legislative history
pointing the other way.38  But then it concluded, first, that the lan-
guage of the statute actually supported the Secretary’s actions;39 and
then second, the Court exhaustively demonstrated why the Secretary’s
actions better effectuated Congress’s purposes in enacting the pro-
Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 674–75 (1997); Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L.
REV. 347, 347–51 (2005).
32 See Stephen Breyer, The 1991 Justice Lester W. Roth Lecture, On the Uses of Legisla-
tive History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 847 (1992).
33 Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81 (2007).
34 See id. at 84.  The statute at issue in this case was designed to account for the impact of a
federal presence on local school districts by generally prohibiting a state from reducing funding
to those districts receiving federal aid.  It exempts, however, those states where the expenditure-
per-pupil for the highest-per-pupil district does not exceed the lowest-per-pupil district by more
than twenty-five percent, and states that the Secretary of Education should not consider the top
five percent nor the bottom five percent of school districts by expenditures when making this
calculation.  The Secretary of Education’s regulation promulgating this exception changed this
provision to percentile of school districts by students.  20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(2) (2006).
35 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(2)(B)(i).
36 Zuni, 550 U.S. at 90–91.
37 Id. at 89.
38 Id. at 93.
39 Id. at 91.
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gram at issue.40  In his dissent, Justice Scalia insisted that the statute’s
language simply did not make sense under the Court’s interpretation,
and that the Secretary’s method of measuring the relevant percentiles
could not stand.41  For present purposes, the importance of Zuni lies
not in its particular outcome, but in the terms of the debate on the
Court.  Even the majority felt obliged to demonstrate that its interpre-
tation—which it would be generous to term a strained reading of the
text—depended for its legitimacy on its consistency with the text en-
acted by Congress.42  The Supreme Court, twenty-five years into the
tenure of Justice Scalia, does not any longer invoke the spirits of stat-
utes to overcome their texts.43  It was not politic, and it was not charm-
ing, for Justice Scalia to complain every time his colleagues
misstepped in statutory cases, particularly when everyone otherwise
agreed on the result.  But he took the long view that interpretive
methodology matters, and the terms of statutory debate among the
Justices have accordingly been transformed.
Second, in constitutional law, Justice Scalia has also taken the
long view.  Early in his tenure, he delivered a lecture announcing his
adoption of originalism as a constitutional interpretive philosophy.44
He later expanded his account of originalism in a book,45 and has es-
poused the merits of that interpretive methodology consistently ever
since.  He has also, of course, put originalism to work in his opinions
on the Court.46  It is worth noting, as an aside, that he has tempered
his adherence to originalism by recognizing that he operates within a
system of stare decisis, so that he is largely willing to apply no-
noriginalist precedents that do not otherwise demand overruling.47
As with his textualism, Justice Scalia’s consistent insistence on
originalism has also contributed to an intense academic revival.48
40 Id. at 92–93.
41 Id. at 111–12 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42 See id. at 93–94 (majority opinion).
43 See id.
44 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
45 SCALIA, supra note .
46 Examples abound, but for a particularly prominent (and controversial) example, see
Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
47 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
48 Justice Scalia’s work has been the subject of many books, and many more law review
articles—a recent search turned up some four hundred law review articles referring to Justice
Scalia in the title.  A sample of such work includes JOYCE A. BAUGH, JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA
AND THE FRESHMAN EFFECT (1989); JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CON-
STITUTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA (2009); RICHARD A. BRISBIN JR., JUS-
TICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL (1997); JOSEPH L. GERKIN, WHAT
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Originalism as a judicial philosophy has been refined by scholars
across the political spectrum, and has been the subject of scores of
articles and books, some defending and others attacking it as a meth-
odology.49  Whatever one thinks about the merits of these disputes, it
is fair to say that constitutional law, both in the academy and in the
courts, is done differently today than it was a generation ago.  The
influence of originalism on the Supreme Court is more sporadic, par-
ticularly as the Court operates within doctrinal fields already satu-
rated by precedent, but it is worth noting that virtually all the Justices
apply originalist methodologies when they believe that the materials
provide an answer.50
The long game that Justice Scalia has played is one of consistent
and insistent devotion to interpretive methodologies that are applied
prior to the outcome in any particular case.  He has been outspoken,
both in opinions and extrajudicially, about his methodologies and why
he believes they are the only legitimate way for judges to discharge
their offices consistently with their place in the constitutional struc-
ture.  More than any other contemporary Justice—indeed, perhaps
any Justice in history—Justice Scalia has sought to marry his jurispru-
dence explicitly to the judicial role, and to do so prior to the merits of
any particular case before the Court.51
GOOD IS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY?  JUSTICE SCALIA IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
(2007); KENNETH W. MILLER & DAVID NIVEN, DEATH JUSTICE: REHNQUIST, SCALIA, THOMAS,
AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DEATH PENALTY (2009); RALPH A. ROSSUM, ANTONIN
SCALIA’S JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND TRADITION (2006); DAVID A. SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER
E. SMITH, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA (1996); CHRISTOPHER E.
SMITH, JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE SUPREME COURT’S CONSERVATIVE MOMENT (1993);
JAMES B. STAAB, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA: A HAMILTONIAN ON
THE SUPREME COURT (2006); PAUL I. WEIZER, THE OPINIONS OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA:
THE CAUSTIC CONSERVATIVE (2004); Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Execu-
tive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002 (2007); Bradford R. Clark, The Constitutional Structure and the Juris-
prudence of Justice Scalia, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 753 (2003); Frank B. Cross, Determinants of
Citations to Supreme Court Opinions (and the Remarkable Influence of Justice Scalia), 18 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 177 (2010); Nadine Strossen, Tribute to Justice Antonin Scalia, 62 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 1 (2006).
49 For examples, see sources cited supra note 48.
50 See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 576–600; U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,
783 (1995).
51 Of course, many Justices have made important and distinguished contributions as schol-
ars.  Obvious examples include BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRO-
CESS (1921); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (Little, Brown & Co. 1923);
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Ronald D.
Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., 1987).  My modest claim is not that Justice Scalia’s scholarly
contributions necessarily match theirs, but that his theoretical account for how Justices should go
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By contrast, consider how common it is for judges to discharge
their offices without explicit methodological commitments.  Is it more
legitimate to decide cases on an ad hoc basis, independent of any
methodological commitments, so that the outcome in each case is one
that the Justice finds congenial?  Justice Breyer has taken on the chal-
lenge and sought to ground his judicial performance in a theory exter-
nal to any particular case.52  Justice David Souter provided his own
account in a notable commencement address, but only after his retire-
ment from active service.53  Of course, Justices routinely address the
implications for our democratic institutions of their decisions, but they
rarely seek systematically to describe and defend a consistent inter-
pretive methodology that is attentive to the Court’s role: to say what
the law is in the course of deciding contested cases, but to do so in a
manner that is respectful of and consistent with the Constitution’s fun-
damental commitment to republican self government.  Throughout
our history, though, few if any Justices have sought to legitimate their
own place in the constitutional system in the way that Justice Scalia
has sought to—now for two and a half decades.  I submit that his long
game is working, and that history will record his tenure as one of
enormous impact.  Contrary to early and midterm reports, his person-
ality—which has at different times been termed gregarious, and then
snarky—will not be the key to his legacy.  Instead, his place in history
will be marked by the force of his ideas and his consistent and elegant
expression of them.
about their jobs is explicitly about the role of the Supreme Court in the American constitutional
system.
52 See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITU-
TION (2005).
53 See Justice David H. Souter, Text of Justice David Souter’s Speech: Harvard Commence-
ment Remarks (as delivered), HARVARD GAZETTE, May 27, 2010, available at http://news.
harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/05/text-of-justice-david-souters-speech.
